A 25 percent tariff on imported cars and parts sits inside a tariff system that courts have already cut back, and the legal route explains why.
The US charges a 25 percent tariff on imported cars from April 2025 and on auto parts from May 2025, under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act. USMCA-compliant parts are exempt. Steel and aluminium face 50 percent. Importers pay, but the burden is shared with consumers, and car prices were expected to rise.
In April 2025 the United States put a 25 percent tariff on every imported car, Mexican and Canadian models included. By July 2026 the country's overall average effective tariff rate stood at 12.1 percent, well below the estimated 27 percent peak it hit in the spring of 2025. Metals and vehicles are the items most affected by the tariffs, and the legal route taken to tax them explains a good deal about what has changed and what has not.
What is a car tariff, and who actually pays it?
A tariff is an import tax paid by the importer. Think of it as a toll at the border gate: the carmaker, or the distributor bringing in a vehicle, hands over a percentage of the goods' value before they can pass. The aim of a tariff is to make imports dearer so that buyers turn to local ones, and supporters say that stimulates the home economy and helps shrink trade deficits.
Economists are close to unanimous that tariffs backfire. The cost does not stay with the foreign supplier. It is spread across importers, exporters and consumers in some mix, and tariffs meant to shield an industry can harm it by raising the price of inputs and inviting retaliation. That last point matters for cars, where one vehicle is built from thousands of parts.
The cost of a tariff does not stay with the foreign supplier; it is shared by importer, exporter and consumer.
Which tariffs apply to imported cars and parts?
The key law is Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. It lets the president impose tariffs, on the recommendation of the commerce secretary, when imports are judged to threaten national security. For decades it was almost dormant: used only in 1979 and 1982, and not at all between the founding of the World Trade Organization in 1995 and 8 March 2018, when steel and aluminium duties revived it. Each use follows a set process: the commerce secretary investigates, holds public hearings and decides whether the imports threaten national security. In his second term Trump has applied it to cars, small trucks, engines and parts brought in from abroad, to medium- and heavy-duty trucks, buses and their parts, and to metals, lumber and furniture. The duty is assessed on the full value of the goods, not on a reduced foreign price.
The car timeline runs as follows. In January 2025 the president unveiled sweeping tariffs aimed at Canada and Mexico, putting at risk a supply chain so tightly integrated that parts cross the borders several times before a car is finished. The Big Three lobbied for exemptions, warning that American firms would suffer more than overseas rivals. Tariffs on vehicles that comply with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) were delayed, but brands that were not USMCA-compliant and built cars in Canada or Mexico, BMW among them, were hit from 4 March 2025. In April 2025 came the 25 percent tariff on all imported cars, and in May it was extended to parts, with USMCA-compliant parts from Mexico or Canada exempt.
There is also a safety valve. In April 2025 carmakers paying the 25 percent on imported cars were excused from the separate steel and aluminium duties, and were given a rebate on part of the tariffs they paid over the next two years. Otherwise the metal duties would have stacked on top of the vehicle duty.
| Measure | Legal basis | Rate | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Imported cars | Section 232 | 25 percent | Imposed April 2025, including cars from Mexico and Canada |
| Auto parts | Section 232 | 25 percent | Extended in May 2025; USMCA-compliant parts exempt |
| Steel and aluminium | Section 232 | 25 percent from March 2025, 50 percent from June 2025 | UK stayed at 25 percent |
| Copper | Section 232 | 50 percent | Effective 1 August 2025; cathode copper excluded |
| Global 'Liberation Day' tariffs | IEEPA | At least 10 percent | Ruled illegal by the Supreme Court in February 2026 |
| Global 10 percent tariff | Section 122 | 10 percent for 150 days | Ran to 24 July 2026; ruled illegal by trade court, under appeal |
| Canadian motor vehicles | Section 338 | 50 percent | Not presently effective |
Why does the legal basis matter?
Because it decides which tariffs survive. In February 2026 the Supreme Court ruled in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump that the tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the 'Liberation Day' measures, were illegal. The government had collected an estimated US$166 billion from more than 330,000 businesses, and those sums have to be refunded. The president then announced a 10 percent global tariff using Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, lasting 150 days until 24 July 2026, and the Court of International Trade has ruled that it too is illegal, with an appeal under way.
Those rulings, together with changes and negotiations, brought the overall rate down from the 2025 peak to 12.1 percent as of 21 July 2026. The car tariffs sit under a different law. After the Supreme Court ruling Trump promised to look for other ways of setting tariffs without involving Congress, and several observers suggested Section 232 as an option. The New York Times reported that courts are likely to find Section 232 harder to review, because they usually defer to the executive on national security.
How do tariffs reach the price you pay?
Start with the 25 percent charged on the value of an imported car. A distributor paying it can absorb the cost, push it onto the foreign supplier or add it to the sticker price, and when the tariffs were imposed in April 2025, car prices were expected to increase. Studies of the 2025 tariffs overall have found that they raised expenses and cut earnings for companies and raised costs for households.
Cars built in the United States are not immune. In 2023 the country imported 44 percent of its aluminium and 26 percent of its steel, mostly from Canada. When those metals carry a duty of 25 or 50 percent, domestic assembly gets dearer too. The Big Three made this argument when they asked for exemptions, and the rebate and the exemption from the metal duties for carmakers paying the vehicle tariff were designed to soften it.
Why did the supply chain matter so much?
Decades of free trade agreements, USMCA among them, taught car factories in the United States, Canada and Mexico to pass parts back and forth several times during manufacture. The USMCA, negotiated in 2020 to replace NAFTA, had recommitted the three countries to zero tariffs on most traded products. Exempting USMCA-compliant parts spares that cross-border traffic, which is why a car's origin and parts content, not just its badge, shape its tariff exposure.
Is the plan bringing car production home?
The administration's case is that tariffs will boost home manufacturing, safeguard national security and stand in for federal income taxes. It sees trade deficits as inherently harmful, a view economists have criticised as a flawed understanding of trade. The promised rise in manufacturing jobs has not been realised so far, and corporate bankruptcies rose to their highest level since 2010. Even so, US GDP kept growing, which was partly attributed to the administration backing away from the first, higher tariff rates, and there is no definitive sign of a significant aggregate effect on the labour market, though the most exposed industries show some weakness against the pre-2025 trend.
Context helps. By volume the United States ranks second among the world's carmakers, producing roughly 10 million units a year, against peaks of 13 to 15 million in the 1970s and early 2000s. By value it was also the world's largest importer of cars in 2023 and the fourth-largest exporter. Foreign-owned brands have built factories there for decades; as of 2012 Toyota had 31,000 US employees, against 80,000 at Ford and 71,100 at Chrysler. Tariffs on imports land on a market in which foreign and domestic makers are closely intertwined.
The 2024 campaign promised more. Trump pledged tariffs of 60 percent on China, 100 percent on Mexico and 20 percent on all other countries, and he floated tariffs to punish American companies that outsourced production. In April 2025 he suggested that tariff revenue could eventually replace income taxes for people earning less than US$200,000 a year; economists disagreed, and the Tax Foundation judged the idea mathematically impossible.
The first Trump administration offers a precedent. Its steel and aluminium duties of 2018 and the China trade war did not achieve their goals, by most assessments: the trade deficit grew, growth cooled, factory jobs stayed away and prices climbed.
Which cars are most exposed?
The cars most exposed are vehicles built outside the USMCA area, and vehicles from non-USMCA brands assembled in Canada or Mexico, as BMW's were from 4 March 2025. Because tariffs exist to push import prices up, exposed models become relatively costly against domestic ones.
What should a buyer do about it?
Ask where the car was assembled, and where its major parts came from. A vehicle built under USMCA rules with compliant parts is in a different position from a fully imported one. Compare prices on cars with similar specifications. A tariff's cost is shared among importer, exporter and consumer, so the sticker price will not necessarily show the whole of it.
What stands in the way of the tariffs?
Courts, mainly. The Constitution gives Congress sole authority to levy taxes, tariffs included, though since 1930 laws have let the president impose them unilaterally on national security grounds. The Supreme Court has already invalidated one set, and the Section 122 case is on appeal. Retaliation is a second risk. In 2020, when the president put a 10 percent tariff on Canadian aluminium, he withdrew it a month later, three hours before Canada planned to retaliate.
Where this goes next
Under consideration are further tariffs covering telecom and power grid equipment, industrial chemicals, plastic piping, cast iron and iron fittings, and large-scale batteries, which matter to electric cars. The April 2026 metals rules set a 15 percent rate for certain metal-intensive industrial and grid equipment through 2027, a 10 percent rate for products made abroad entirely with American steel, aluminium and copper, and exempt products that are 15 percent or less metal. A global tariff under Section 122 expired on 24 July 2026, subject to the appeal, and the president has promised alternative routes that bypass Congress.
For the car market the question is whether the 25 percent tariffs on vehicles and parts stay in their current form, are adjusted through negotiation, or are tested in court. Observers expect the Section 232 route to be harder to challenge in court than the one that brought down the IEEPA tariffs.





